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NOTE
FAIR USERS OR CONTENT ABUSERS?
THE AUTOMATIC FLAGGING OF
NON-INFRINGING VIDEOS BY
CONTENT ID ON YOUTUBE
I.

INTRODUCTION

When was the last time you watched a video on YouTube? How
about the last time you uploaded one onto the site? Now, when was the
last time you thought about the copyright implications of any of those
videos? Most people have probably never contemplated the implications
of copyright law with respect to YouTube, and that is where the trouble
begins, because copyright law has not caught up with modem means of
creation on the Internet.'
Congress did recognize the necessity of updating copyright laws in
the late 1990s when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act2
("DMCA"), but since then, the law has not progressed, while the Internet
has grown in leaps and bounds. 3 Not only has the Internet expanded, but
so has the popularity of video-sharing websites.4 Title II of the DMCA
governs the liability of Internet service providers ("ISPs") for copyright

1. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 1 (1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
(summarizing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which, in 1998, was the last
change made to copyright law); Martin B. Robins, A Good Idea at the Time: Recent Digital
Millennium Copyright Act § 512(c) Safe HarborJurisprudence-Analysisand Critique of Current
Applications and Implications, 15 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3-5 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011301 (2012)).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 512; Robins, supranote 1, at 3-5.
4. See David E. Ashley, Note, The Public as Creatorand Infringer: Copyright Law Applied
to the Creators of User-Generated Video Content, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
563, 572-73 (2010) (mentioning the tremendous growth of YouTube since its inception, which
Congress did not anticipate when enacting the DMCA). See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001) (recognizing that "the only thing that remains constant is
change"), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-I .pdf.
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infringement by website users.5 One of the functions of the DMCA is to
provide safe harbors to ISPs that limit their liability for infringement on
their websites.6 To be eligible for these safe harbors, however, ISPs have
to meet a series of criteria.7
Since the DMCA has been around for well over a decade, its
application to websites like YouTube indicates that it is governing
websites that did not even exist when it was enacted in 1998. 9 As a
result, the application of the DMCA heavily favors the mass media
copyright holders, and not the small users who generate much of the
content on YouTube. l0 Furthermore, YouTube launched an automated
digital fingerprinting system, called "Content ID," in 2007." This
system makes it much easier, and much more likely, for user-generated
content to be flagged as infringing, regardless of the context in which it
is uploaded. 2 The favoritism that arises and the automated systems

5. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1, 8.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
7. See id.
8. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25-26, 40, 42 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) is applicable to YouTube, and that YouTube is eligible for the
limitations on liability that the section provides).
9. Robins, supranote 1, at 4.
10. See Patrick McKay, Note, Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to
Accommodate Fan-Made Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century, 24 REGENT U. L. REV.
117, 124-27 (2011) (discussing the DMCA takedown procedure and the dominant position that
mass media has in easily stopping online expression without any consequences). Henry Jenkins
identifies the problem with current copyright law as follows:
Current copyright law simply doesn't have a category for dealing with amateur creative
expression. Where there has been a "public interest" factored into the legal definition of
fair use ... it has been advanced in terms of legitimated classes of users and not a
generalized pubic right to cultural participation. Our current notion of fair use is an
artifact of an era when few people had access to the marketplace of ideas, and those who
did fell into certain professional classes. It surely demands close reconsideration as we
develop technologies that broaden who may produce and circulate cultural materials.
HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 189 (2006).
For purposes of this Note a "mass media copyright holder" is a "major media compan[y] that
control[s] significant copyrighted properties" and a "small user" is a "non-professional creator[] of
User-Generated Video Content." Ashley, supra note 4, at 570.
11. See Bryan E. Arsham, Note, Monetizing Infringement: A New Legal Regime for Hosts of
User-GeneratedContent, 101 GEO. L.J. 775, 791 (2013); Thabet Alfishawi, Improving Content ID,
YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2012/10/improvingcontent-id.html.
12. See Taylor B. Bartholomew, Note, The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and
the Problem with Content ID, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 66, 69-70 (2015) (pointing out that
frivolous claims get filed through Content ID that never would have been filed otherwise); see also
How Content ID Works, YOuTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370 (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015) (describing how the system works).
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used contradict the constitutional purpose of copyright law because
they discourage smaller users from creating content for fear of being
sued for infringement."3
This Note will explore the problems inherent in the Content ID
system, given the fact that it is automated and the law governing
copyright favors mass media holders.' 4 Part II of this Note will explain
the development of the impact of copyright law on the Internet, focusing
on the DMCA and its application to YouTube. 5 Part II will also explore
how the DMCA affects users and the content they generate. 6 Then, Part
III will begin with a discussion of the increasing use of automated
infringement filters by ISPs and the problems with automated systems
like Content ID. 17 The first problem Part III will examine is the system's
inability to recognize fair use coupled with the necessity of educating
users about their rights under the fair use doctrine. 8 The second problem
Part III will address is the disproportionate monetization of videos
flagged by the system, which allows mass media copyright holders and
YouTube to split all of the profits, while the content creator gets
nothing."' Part IV of this Note will propose additional statutory
provisions to be enacted for educating users about their rights-in the
hope that it will encourage them to use the counter-notification systems
available to them-and requiring proportional monetization of videos for
content creators who largely upload original works.2 ° This Note will
conclude by reaffirming the notion that copyright law must be updated
to catch up with the modern Internet, including updating protections for
users and the content they generate.2
II.

THE HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

In order to properly understand where copyright law stands today
and the significance of the DMCA, it is important to first understand the

13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ashley, supra note 4, at 570, 587-88; Andrea Frey, Note,
To Sue or Not to Sue: Video-Sharing Web Sites, Copyright Infringement, and the Inevitability of
Corporate Control, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 167, 170 (2007) (noting that the framers of
the Constitution recognized "the value of artistic expression" when including clause 8 of Article I).
14. See infra Parts II-III.
15. See infra Part H.A-C.
16. See infra Part ll.D.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part TV.
21. See infra Part V.
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origins of copyright law in the United States.22 Therefore, Subpart A will
outline a very brief history of U.S. copyright law.23 Once this
background is established, Subpart B will cover the evolution of
copyright law and the Internet with the enactment of the DMCA.2 4 Next,
Subpart C will use case law to explore the application of the DMCA to
ISPs, specifically video-sharing websites like YouTube. 25 Finally,
Subpart D will examine the treatment of user-generated content under
the DMCA in the current, increasingly user-generated online world.26
A.

A BriefHistory of U.S. Copyright Law

Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution allows Congress to
enact legislation to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."27 The first U.S. copyright
law was adopted in 1790 and was much more limited in scope than the
copyright laws of today.28 The exclusive rights afforded to creators were
limited to "printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending."2 9 These rights
only lasted for fourteen years, and the only works covered by the law
were books, charts, and maps.30
Since the first U.S. copyright law in 1790, the list of protected
works has grown immensely.3 Musical compositions were added in
1831, as were designs, etchings, and engravings.3 2 Photographs were
made part of the list in 1865; moving pictures were incorporated in
1911; and, in 1971, sound recordings became protected works, as well.33
Today, the list of protected works has expanded even more and is fairly
extensive.34 The list includes: literary works; musical works; dramatic
22.
23.
24.

See infta Part I.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part H.B.

25.

See infra Part II.C.

26. See infra Part II.D.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831); see Frey, supra note 13, at 170
(describing extensive additions to U.S. copyright law since 1790); infra text accompanying notes
32-37 (listing an expansive scope of works protected by amended copyright laws).
29. Act ofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1.
30. Id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
32. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1,4 Stat. 436, 436; Frey, supranote 13, at 170.
33.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES

SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 34-35 (1973) (referencing the Act adding photographs); Mark
G. Tratos, Entertainment on the Internet: The Evolution of Entertainment,Production,Distribution
Ownership and Control in the Digital Age, in ENTERTAINMENT LAW 331, 340 (Howard Siegel ed.,
3d ed. 2004); Frey, supra note 13, at 170.
34. 17U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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works; pantomimes; choreographic works; pictorial works; graphic
works; sculptural works; motion pictures; sound recordings; and
architectural works.35 Furthermore, derivative works36 are also protected
to the extent of the material contributed by the author.3 7 In addition to
the expansion of the list of protected works, the exclusive rights afforded
by copyright protection have increased, as has the duration of this
protection.3 8 A creator's exclusive rights to his copyrighted works
include: the right to reproduce the work in copies; the right to prepare
derivative works based on the original; the right to distribute copies of
the work; the right to perform the work publically; and the right to
display the work publically.39 These rights generally last for the life of
the creator plus seventy years after the creator's death.4"
While the exclusive rights granted to content creators by copyright
protection have been expanded over the years, several limitations on
those rights have also been incorporated as part of the copyright law
when it was amended in 1976.41 One such limitation is the exception
allowing fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news,
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.42 It has been noted:
Fair use originated as a common law doctrine developed by judges "to
perform the vital constitutional goal of ensuring that the balance
between encouraging authors to create through the grant of a limited
monopoly and the need to permit reasonable, unconsented-to and
uncompensated uses by second authors and the public is not upset by
overbroad assertion of rights." In other words, the doctrine protects
uses that are "of a character that serves the copyright objective of
without
stimulating productive thought and public instruction
43
excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity."
35. Id.
36. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "derivative work" as follows:
A copyrightable creation that is based on a preexisting product; a translation, musical
arrangement, fictionalization, motion-picture version, abridgement, or any other recast or
adapted form of an original work. Only the holder of the copyright on the original form
can produce or permit someone else to produce a derivative work.
Derivative Work, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1744 (9th ed. 2009).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
38. Id. §§ 106, 302(a) (indicating that copyright protection lasts for seventy years past the
author's life, much longer than the fourteen years provided for by the first copyright act passed in
1790, and listing rights far more extensive than those provided in the original act as well).
39. Id.§ 106.
40.
41.

Id.§ 302.
Id.§§ 107-112; Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546-60.

42.

17 U.S.C. § 107.

43.

Matt

Williams,

The

Truth

and the

"Truthliness"

About

Knowing

Material

Misrepresentations,9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34-35 (2007) (footnotes call numbers omitted) (citations
omitted).
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Fair use is determined on a case-by-case basis, but there are several
non-exhaustive factors to be considered when making the determination
about whether something falls within fair use or not, including:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 44
The determination of fair use is often complicated because there is
no agreed upon definition of the doctrine, nor are there any bright line
rules. 45 The first factor looks at whether the new work that is using
copyrighted material adds some new purpose or character to the workwhether the new work is transformative.46 Second, the analysis examines
whether the new work is closer to the type of work intended to be
protected; the more creative a work is, that is, the less fact-based it is,
the more likely a judge is going to consider it one that is intended to be
protected. 47 The third factor of the fair use analysis simply looks at how
much copyrighted material the new work uses.48 Fourth, and finally, fair
use requires a court to look at the impact the new work will have both on
the potential market for the copyrighted work and for derivative works
based on it.49 Because there are no bright line rules for fair use and the
factors are just a starting point, judges are left with their own
understanding of the doctrine, the four factors above, precedents that
vary from each other, and their instincts whenever they are confronted
with a fair use case.5" Inevitably, individual judges consider the factors
differently, and each case has to be decided entirely based on its own
facts, making a uniform doctrine impossible to identify by legal
professionals, let alone laypeople trying to understand or navigate the
applicable copyright law when they upload videos online. 1
44. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
45. Williams, supra note 43, at 36, 39 (2007); see also Rebecca Alderfer Rock, Comment,
Fair Use Analysis in DMCA Takedown Notices: Necessary or Noxious?, 86 TEMP. L. REv. 691, 699
(2014) (mentioning the difficulty of identifying fair use).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1); Rock, supra note 45, at 698.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2); Rock, supra note 45, at 698.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3); Rock, supra note 45, at 698.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); Rock, supra note 45, at 698-99.
50. Williams, supra note 43, at 36.
51. See id. at 35-37. Williams points out:
If judges, treatise writers, and the Register of Copyrights cannot comfortably predict the
outcome of fair use cases, how can we hold a copyright owner liable for asserting in a
takedown notice that something is infringing when a potentially successful fair use
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B.

CopyrightLaw and the Internet: The Enactment of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act

During the late 1990s, Congress became concerned about the effect
the Internet had on copyright protection, and so, in 1998, President Bill
Clinton signed the DMCA into law.52 The DMCA has five titles, but the
one relevant to this Note is Title II: The Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act.53 Title II creates limitations on the liability of
ISPs for copyright infringement committed by their users for four
different types of activities: (1) "[t]ransitory communications;" (2)
"[s]ystem caching;" (3) "[s]torage of information systems and networks
at the direction of users;" and (4) "[providing] information location
tools." 54 This Note focuses on the third activity covered by the DMCA,
55
which encompasses the category of activity that YouTube engages in.
Under § 512(c), an ISP is not liable for copyright infringement if it:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
infringement... responds
(C) upon notification of claimed
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material
be infringing or to be the subject of
that is claimed to
56
activity.
infringing
If even one of these criteria is not met, the ISP is not eligible for the safe
harbors that would limit its liability for infringement.57 In another

argument exists? Moreover, how can we hold a user of copyrighted material who sends a
putback notice liable for seeking the replacement of material that the user mistakenly
believes to be fair?
Id. at 39; see also Rock, supra note 45 (explaining the relevance, or lack thereof, of the fair use
doctrine when determining the copyright liability of video-sharing websites).
52. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 4, at vi (noting Congress's concerns about piracy at
the time of the enactment of the DMCA).
53. Id. The amendments adopted in Title II are codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
54. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 1,at 8.
55. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25-26, 40, 42 (2d Cir. 2012)
(holding that YouTube can be protected by the limitation on liability for copyright infringement
provided for by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
(indicating by the structure of the statute that the factors are conjunctive).
57. See id.
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provision, § 512(i), the DMCA provides general criteria for eligibility
for the limited liability provided by the statute that applies to all of the
sections.58 Under § 512(i), the ISP must have reasonably implemented a
policy for the termination of user accounts under appropriate
circumstances that does not interfere with standard technical measures
and informs users of this policy. 59 An ISP does not, however, have to
monitor its website for infringing material; it only has to take down
material for which it receives valid infringement notifications.60
Section 512(c) also lays out the elements necessary for a
notification of infringement to be valid.6 For a notification to satisfy
§ 512(c)(1)(C), it must be: (1) signed by someone authorized to act on
behalf of the copyright holder; (2) identify clearly the work infringed;
(3) identify clearly the allegedly infringing content; (4) contain the
information of the complaining party so that the ISP can contact it; (5)
contain a statement that the complaining party has submitted the
notification in good faith; and (6) contain a statement that all the
information in the notification is accurate.62 If the notification fails to
"include[] substantially" the above-mentioned criteria, then it will not be
considered in determining whether the ISP has knowledge of the
infringement.63 But when a valid notification is submitted to the ISP or
its designated agent, the ISP must take down the infringing material.'
In addition to criteria for eligibility and notification procedures,
§ 512 also provides for counter-notification procedures.65 An online user
can use these procedures if it believes that the removal of the content
was invalid or a mistake.66 The requirements for a counter-notification
are similar to those for a notification and include: (1) the signature of the
ISP user; (2) an identification of the material that was taken down and
where it was beforehand; (3) a statement of good faith; (4) the ISP user's
information; and (5) consent to the jurisdiction of the relevant federal
district court.6 7

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. § 512(i).
Id.
Id. § 512(m)(1).
Id. § 512(c)(3).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).

65. Id. § 512(g)(3).
66. Id. § 512(g)(2); Jon M. Garon, Tidying Up the Internet: Takedown of Unauthorized
Content Under Copyright, Trademark,and Defamation Law, 41 CAP. U. L. REv. 513, 525 (2013)

(explaining that the counter-notification system encourages reinstatement of material that was
wrongly flagged).
67. Id. § 512(g)(3).
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When the DMCA was enacted, its primary purpose was to combat
piracy,8 and the Internet was still in the world of Web 1.0 where
websites presented all the content to users.69 Commentators have noted:
At the time that Congress crafted [the DMCA], the World Wide Web
was a simpler place. [ISPs] hosted websites managed by webmasters
who actively controlled the materials made available on webpages.
of how the safe harbor
Industry negotiators had a relatively clear sense
70
would function in this Web 1.0 ecosystem.
Since that time, however, the Internet has shifted to what is now
called Web 2.0,71 where websites are essentially platforms for content
uploaded by users-the opposite of Web 1.0.72 As a result, the
application of the DMCA was complicated by the increasing use of Web
2.0 websites and applications. 7" The potential liability of ISPs became
more uncertain as users gained the ability to disseminate information
themselves and as websites began to use automated systems.74 Despite
this change in the Internet and its uses, copyright law has not caught up,
still favoring the mass media copyright holders who dominated in the
last century.75 In fact, copyright law may have even taken a step back
with the implementation of the Copyright Alert System ("CAS") in
2013, which further supports the notice and takedown system.76 Five of
the country's largest ISPs, which copyright law already favors-AT&T,
Cablevision, Time Warner Cable, Verizon, and Comcast-together with
consumer advocacy groups, created the CAS.77 Development of the CAS
began in 2011 with 5 key goals: (1) understanding what consumers knew
about online infringement; (2) protecting consumer privacy while
ensuring accuracy in identifying infringing material; (3) developing an
alert and delivery system when infringing material is identified; (4)
creating a neutral and independent review process for identified material
so consumers could challenge claims of infringement; and (5) creating
68. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 4, at vi-vii; see also Ashley, supra note 4, at
581-82 (considering how Congress intended to combat piracy with the DMCA).
69. Robins, supranote 1, at 3-4.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. See id. at 4 (describing the evolution of technology that led to Web 2.0).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See McKay, supra note 10, at 122-24, 126 (examining how the domination of mass media
corporations in the entertainment creation industry allows copyright law to favor those
corporations).
76.

See CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO., THE COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM: PHASE ONE AND

BEYOND 1, 6 (2014), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/PhaseOne-AndBeyond.pdf.
77. Id. at 3, 13 n.4.
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educational materials for consumers.7 8 The Center for Copyright
Information describes the CAS as follows:
[A] tiered notice and response system aimed at reducing copyright
infringement over peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. It is built
simultaneously to encourage consumers to embrace the growing
number of affordable licensed sources of films, music, and television
programming content available online from a variety of different
services and in many different formats. The first-of-its-kind
collaboration, the CAS is a multi-stakeholder effort focused on
approaching the issue of digital copyright infringement in a fair and
79
consumer-friendly manner.
The CAS works through multiple levels of alerts that notify users of
infringement on their accounts and is based on the premise that most
Internet users will correct the problem if it is brought to their attention. 80
While the CAS is aimed at influencing the "vast majority of internet
users who may not fully understand the legal, economic or social
consequences of their behavior," it does not take into account the fact
that people will likely respond to alerts out of fear of being sued for
infringement by huge media conglomerates and lack of education about
their own rights.81 Given the DMCA's original intent of battling piracy, 2
its application to websites like YouTube,83 and the implementation of the
CAS, which also favors mass media copyright holders over ISP users, it
is no surprise that copyright law is far behind the Internet's development
84
and desperately needs to catch up to protect online users.
C. The Application of the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act
to Video Sharing Websites Such as YouTube
Since the enactment of the DMCA, there have been several cases
interpreting the statute and its application to ISPs.85 Many of the cases
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id. at 2; Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifestofor
User-GeneratedRights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 936 (2009); Laura Leister, Note,
YouTube and the Law: A Suppression of Creative Freedom in the 21st Century, 37 T. MARSHALL L.
REv. 109, 118 (2011); see also Garon, supra note 66, 524-26 (pointing out abuses of the takedown
and notification system as well as the only recourse the average Internet user has-counternotifications).
82. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 4, at vi; Ashley, supranote 4, at 581-82.
83. See infra Part I.C.
84. See generally Halbert, supra note 81 (discussing the failure of the DMCA to protect users
and the content that they generate online).
85. See Robins, supra note 1, at 10-21 (reviewing the case law applying the DMCA to ISPs
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that deal with the application of the DMCA are circuit court or district
case
court cases. 86 However, there is also one important Supreme Court
87
on the subject that sets the tone for DMCA application to ISPs.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,Ltd.8 8 was decided
by the Supreme Court in 2005, and held that the limitations on liability
provided by the DMCA safe harbors are not available to ISPs that
promote infringing uses of their websites.8 9 In Grokster, the defendants
were in the business of distributing free software that allowed computer
users to share files with each other.9" The plaintiff, Metro-GoldwynMayer, sued, alleging that the defendant knowingly and intentionally
distributed its software, so that users could copy and share copyrighted
works. 9 Since the use of the software itself was not always an infringing
activity, 92 the issue in the case became whether a distributor of software
that can be used for both infringing and non-infringing purposes is liable
for copyright infringement committed by third party users of the
product.93 The Court found the defendant liable for the infringing
activity of third party users of its software because it expressly told
recipients to use the software to download copyrighted work, and
actually encouraged infringement by the users. 94 Therefore, Grokster
established the rule that an ISP is liable for infringement committed by
its users when it actually encourages infringement as the primary use of
its platform.95 This rule makes sense in light of the DMCA's
requirements for an ISP to be eligible for the safe harbors, namely the
requirements that the ISP does not know of the infringing activity or of
any facts or circumstances that would raise suspicion of infringing
activity.96 If the ISP is encouraging infringement, it stands to reason that
that would raise the suspicion
it at least knows of facts or circumstances
97
that infringement is in fact occurring.

and its evolution).
86. See id. at 10-19.
87. See id. at 17.
88. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
89. See id. at 919, 936-37; see also Robins, supra note 1, at 17-19 (explaining the pertinence
of this case to the DMCA despite it not being a direct DMCA case).
90. Metro-Golden-MayerStudios, Inc., 545 U.S. at 919-20.
91. Id.at920-21.
92. See id.at 922.
93. Id. at 918-19; see also Robins, supra note 1, at 17-19 (considering the relevance of this
case to the DMCA and its subsequent application to DMCA cases).
94. Metro-Golden-MayerStudios, Inc., 545 U.S. at 923-24.
95. Id. at 936-37.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012).
97. See Metro-Golden-Mayer Studios, Inc., 545 U.S. at 936-37.
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One of the most important cases interpreting how the DMCA
applies to ISPs is Viacom International,Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.98 This case
began in 2007 in the Southern District of New York, when Viacom filed
suit against YouTube alleging direct and secondary copyright
infringement based on the playback and reproduction of its works on the
website.99 The case was appealed to the Second Circuit..0 and then
remanded back to the Southern District in 2012,11 before finally being
settled in 2014.'02 This case required the Second Circuit to clarify the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions, especially as they related to § 512(c),
because that was the section at issue. °3
In clarifying the relevant provisions of the DMCA, the Second
Circuit construed several terms found in § 512(c), starting with "actual"
and "red flag" knowledge. 0 4 The court decided that actual knowledge
meant knowledge of specific identified instances of infringement
because the statute only requires the takedown of specific infringing
materials once the ISP has been notified of them.' 015 The court proceeded
to say that "red flag" knowledge also requires knowledge of specific
instances, but differs from actual knowledge because it requires an
objective standard in determining that knowledge. 6 Thus, "the actual
knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or
'subjectively' knew of specific infringement, while the red flag
provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts
that would have made the specific infringement 'objectively' obvious to
a reasonable person."'0 7 The Second Circuit remanded the issue of
whether YouTube had actual or red flag knowledge back to the lower
court.' On remand, the Southern District of New York decided that
Viacom failed to meet its burden in proving that YouTube had actual or

98. 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
99. Id.at 28.
100. Id.at 30.
101. Id. at41-42.
102. Diana Sanders, Seven-Year Battle Between Viacom and Google Finally Ends in
Settlement, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f7cOac641690-48e9-b3cl-7f~flafla0ef; Susan M. Stith & Edwin Komen, The DMCA: Seeking Safe Harbor
in a Sea of Troubles, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g--4df87e27-6b31-414f-a14e-8bflccb0c551.
103. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 25-27.
104. Id.at 30-36.
105. Id. at 30, 32.
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id.
108. Id.at 34.
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red flag knowledge of any of the specific infringements at issue in
the suit. 109
The Second Circuit also tackled the phrase "right and ability to
control" in § 512(c)(1)(B). "1 ° It concluded that the "right and ability to
control" content on a website "requires something more than the ability
11
to remove or block access to materials on the [ISP's] website."' The
court never defined what "something more" means, but gave several
examples of what it could look like.' 2 Finally, the court looked at what
"by reason of storage at the direction of the user" means. 1 3 On this
issue, the court determined that storage is more than just actually storing
the material; it includes the functions necessary to allow users access to
the videos and to stream them." 4 As to whether YouTube had the right
and ability to control the content on its website, the court decided that it
did not because all of the algorithms on the website were fully
automated and reacted entirely to user input, without any kind of
employee involvement.'
The decisions of both the Second Circuit and the Southern District
of New York on remand have been cited numerous times by courts
throughout the United States" 16 in cases such as UMG Recordings, Inc.
t
v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,17 Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 18
and Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC." 9 All of these cases went a
109. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
110. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 676 F.3d at36.
111. Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at39.
115. Id. at40.
116. See, e.g., Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427, 2013 WL 6336286, at *2628 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (examining actual and "red flag" knowledge); Capitol Records, LLC v.
Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 543, 545, 553-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (considering the meanings of
"red flag" knowledge, control, and willful blindness).
117. 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, 'UMG filed suit against Veoh for direct,
vicarious, and contributory copyright infringement." Id. at 1013. The court cited the Second
Circuit's definitions of actual knowledge, red flag knowledge, and control. Id. at 1025-27. The court
also added to the definition of "right and ability to control" stating that an ISP must "[e]xert
substantial influence on the activities of users" for it to have control. Id at 1030. Finally, this court
also held that the DMCA protects ISPs against vicarious liability, as well as direct and contributory
liability. See id at 1028-30.
118. 2013 WL 63368386, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). The plaintiffs in this case claimed
that defendant's users abused defendants' online file storage system by sharing copyrighted
materials on it. Id. at * 1. Here, the court first found that defendants were not eligible for DMCA
safe harbors at all because they didn't meet the threshold requirement of having a repeat infringer
policy. Id. at *25. The court then went on to say that even if defendants had met the threshold
requirements, they would not have been eligible for the DMCA's safe harbors because they
encouraged and induced infringement by users. Id. at *32.
119. 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In this case, the court focused primarily on the
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long way in assuring that video-sharing websites, like YouTube, are
covered by the DMCA, as long as they adhere to all of the statute's
provisions. 120 This is great for the ISPs, and even for copyright holders,
because they are assured of a notice-takedown procedure that they can
rely on. 12 1 These cases provide no assurance to users of ISPs,
however. 22 They do not even address the rights of users in relation to
the claims of infringement, which is a huge problem because those rights
get violated every time a video is taken down invalidly. 123 In fact, users
and the content they generate have virtually no protection under the
24
current regime of the DMCA. 1
D. The Treatment of User-GeneratedContent Under the
DigitalMillennium Copyright Act
The prevalence of user-generated content on the Internet has been
on the rise for several years now,' 25 and recently, it has become
something of the backbone of video-sharing websites like YouTube.'2 6
As its name suggests, the users of websites, those people traditionally
seen as "cultural consumers," are those that create user-generated
content, not the traditional "cultural producers" like mass media
copyright holders. 27 This kind of content is relatively new, only
becoming prominent in 2005,128 which means mass media copyright
holders do not yet know how to react to it, especially as it becomes more

objective/subjective distinction between actual and red flag knowledge. Id. at 547-48. The court
determined that when the defendants or its employees never viewed or interacted with the videos
uploaded, the defendants were covered by the DMCA's protections. See id.
at 555. Furthermore, the
court found that even for those videos that the employees did watch, the DMCA could apply to
several of them depending on their content. See id.at 547-49. The court remanded decision about
those videos back to the lower court. Id. at 549.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012); see also Ashley, supra note 4, at 587 (discussing the policy
most ISPs, including YouTube, use when dealing with infringing material).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)-(3). Contra Ashley, supra note 4, at 585-87 (mentioning the
drawbacks for copyright holders in how the notice and takedown procedures work).
122. See Ashley, supra note 4, at 587-88 (noting that the current notice and takedown
procedures don't provide users of ISPs with much incentive to fight back).
123. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process of "Chilling Effects"?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 628 (2006); see also Ashley, supra note 4, at 587-88
(addressing users' general lack of knowledge of copyright law and what most users will do upon
getting notification that their content has been removed).
124. See infra Part I.D.
125. See Halbert, supra note 81, at 925-26.
126. See id at 924-25.
127. Id.at924,927.
128. See id.at 926.
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and more prevalent. 129 At the same time, users want more control over
their own content, which means that they need more rights under the
copyright law-rights that they currently do not have.t"0
The biggest problem that mass media producers have with usergenerated content is that it often uses pieces of copyrighted works to
create something entirely new. 3' Some users create content that is
entirely their own, others copy already existing works and then edit them
into something new, and there are those combine their own material with
pre-existing works. 3 2 Most of these videos take existing works and
reimagine them in new and creative ways, keeping the cultural interest in
them alive, and therefore they likely deserve fair use protections. 3
Given the constitutional purpose of copyright law, 3 4 one would think
that it would embrace user-generated content considering this content
awakens the cultural conscience and has become such a part of our
cultural framework"'-YouTube's statistics prove that practically
everyone either watches or creates online videos.' 36 Unfortunately, this
137
has not been the case.
The mass media copyright holders have been at the top of the
copyright game for a long time, 138 and many of the additions to
copyright protection coverage were made for their benefit.'3 9 These mass
media companies have been favored by the copyright law and see it
primarily as a unidirectional model-the companies actively create and

129. See id, at 927-29.
130. See id. at 926.
131. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PARTICIPATIVE WEB AND USER-CREATED CONTENT:
WEB 2.0, WIKIS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING 18 (2007) (noting that users add their own value to
whatever copyrighted work they use); see also Ashley, supra note 4, at 572-73 (discussing what
user-generated content can be made up of and what kind of protection it deserves); McKay, supra
note 10, at 121-22 (indicating the cultural work of fan-made user-generated content).
132. See Ashley, supra note 4, at 566.
133. Halbert, supranote 81, at 936-41; see also Ashley, supra note 4, at 572-73 (discussing the
changing definition of the creator in an increasingly online world); What Is Fair Use?, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (setting forth the
four factors of fair use).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Frey, supra note 13, at 170.
135. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-GeneratedContent, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1513 (2008) (discussing the rise of YouTube and how it has transformed the Internet).
136. Statistics, YouTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2015) (indicating that hundreds of millions of hours of video are watched each day and that
YouTube has over one billion users).
137. See supraPart H.B-C.
138. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 5 (2009) (indicating
the model that has been "long-favored" by copyright industries is one of vertical monopolization).
139. PATRY, supra note 138 at 6; see also McKay, supra note 10, at 121-24 (pointing out that
copyright laws are one sided so they favor mass media copyright holders and noting the reaction of
mass media copyright holders to the rise of user-generated content).
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the public passively consumes. 140 The rise of the Internet and usergenerated content has turned this model on its head, 141 and the mass
media holders have not been taking it well. 142 User-generated content is
based on the opposite philosophy than that of mass media and, therefore,
poses a direct threat to the mass media copyright holders.143 Thus, mass
media holders want to suppress user generated content. 44 On the other
hand, mass media companies also want to control user-generated content
because they recognize it as a means to promote their products.145 Mass
media companies control user-generated content through copyright
protection and infringement notices, both because this is how they have
controlled it historically and, more importantly, because the current
copyright law leans overwhelmingly in their favor. 14 6 Over time, some
mass media companies began to embrace user-generated content, but
they did so very much on their own terms, quickly putting a stop to
147
content that went in directions that they did not like.
The attitude of mass media companies towards user-generated
content is entirely hypocritical, however. 148 When mass media
companies were still new, they were able to freely borrow from preexisting folk culture without anyone to stop them, but when online users
do essentially the same thing with mass media products, those same
companies are quick to claim copyright protection and halt user
creation. 149' This is completely contrary to the constitutional intention of
copyright law, which is to encourage the growth of culture. 50
Even when the government attempted to update the law in response
to the rise of the Internet, it never contemplated the existence, let alone
the prevalence, of user-generated content.' 5 ' Therefore, the DMCA's
main focus was to stop piracy or the direct copying and distribution of
copyright works.' 5 2 It is entirely unequipped to deal with user-generated
140. PATRY, supranote 138, at 8; McKay, supra note 10, at 123.
141. See McKay, supranote 10, at 123.
142. See PATRY, supranote 138, at 10-11; McKay, supranote 10, at 123.
143. See JENKINS, supranote 10, at 135-36; McKay, supranote 10, at 123.
144. See PATRY, supra note 138, at 10-11; McKay, supra note 10, at 123.
145. See JENKINS, supranote 10, at 138; McKay, supra note 10, at 123.
146. See PATRY, supranote 138, at 11; McKay, supra note 10, at 122-23.
147. See JENKINS, supranote 10, at 156-59; McKay, supranote 10, at 123-24.
148. See JENKINS, supra note 10, at 135-36; see also McKay, supranote 10, at 122 (expressing
the increasing relevance and existence of fan culture and the content it creates).
149. See JENKINS, supra note 10, at 135; McKay, supra note 10, at 122.
150.

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID

ECONOMY 96 (2008); Leister, supra note 81, at 120 (discussing the power that copyright owners
possess and how that power suppresses online users from creating content of their own); McKay,

supra note 10, at 119 (articulating the goal of the Copyright Clause in the Constitution).
151. See Robins, supra note 1, at 3-4.
152. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supranote 4, at vi; Ashley, supranote 4, at 581-82.
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content that transforms and reworks copyrighted material and makes it
into something new.153 Furthermore, the DMCA only provides safe
harbors for ISPs themselves, so the creators of user-generated content
have absolutely no protection in a world where the mass media
copyright holder rules and ISPs' liability is limited.' 54 The lack of
protection for users has become even more problematic since YouTube
launched its Content ID system, discussed further below,1 55 because the
system monitors everything that is uploaded onto the website and
flags any video that has copyrighted content in it 56-- even a video
of a child dancing to a song in the background uploaded to YouTube
by his mother.'57
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.1 58 arose in the Northern District of
California after Lenz uploaded a twenty-second video of her child
dancing to a Prince song on YouTube. 5 9 The song was audible in the
background of the video, and Universal Music Corp. sent YouTube a
takedown notification demanding that the video be removed from the
site. 60 YouTube removed the video and then sent Lenz an email
notification of the removal. 16 ' Lenz then sent a counter-notification
claiming that the video was fair use and demanding that it be put back on
the site. YouTube complied.' 62 Lenz also sued Universal Music Corp.,
alleging misrepresentation under § 512(f) of the DMCA. t63 Lenz

153. Robins, supranote 1, at 3-5. The Internet has changed a lot since the DMCA was enacted
and commentators have said:
[T]he most fundamental change in the web over the last 10 years has been the rise of
"user generated content," that is, the shift from websites that present packaged content
created or controlled by the websites owner, to websites that are essentially services for
publishing content uploaded by others.
With this significance has come legal uncertainty ....
Id.at 3-4 (footnote call number omitted).
154. Halbert, supra note 81, at 931 (establishing that the DMCA rules "balance contetit-owner
concern with service-provider concern," and that even when private initiatives are taken to do the
same, key ISPs are left out as are the actual users who create content online).
155. See infra Part III.A.
156. How Content ID Works, supra note 12.
157. See generally Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Stephanie Lenz sued Universal Music Corp. for misrepresentation pursuant to § 512(f) of the
DMCA after it flagged the video she uploaded of her young child dancing to a Prince song in the
background. Id.at 1152-53.
158. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
159. Id. at 1151-52.
160. Id. at 1152.
161. Id.; see also Rock, supra note 45, at 704-06 (explaining the decision made in this case and
the possible implications that it could have).
162. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2dat 1152.
163. Id.at 1152-53; see also Ashley, supranote 4, at 592-97 (taking up the case as it relates to
fair use and how Stephanie Lenz decided to pursue her claim).
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maintained that Universal did not actually check the video to see if it
music in itwas fair use and just took it down because it had Prince's
64
not based on a good faith belief that it was infringing.'
The court framed the issue as whether the takedown provision of
the DMCA "requires a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine
in formulating a good faith belief that 'use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law."" 65 In other words, the court had to determine whether a fair use
analysis is required to meet the subjective good faith belief standard
established in Rossi v. Motion PictureAss 'n ofAmerica."6 6 In construing
the Rossi standard, the court held that in order to have a good faith belief
that use of material is infringing, a copyright owner has to actually
conduct a fair use analysis before issuing a § 512 takedown notice to the
host website. 16 7 Stated differently, this means that if a user makes an
allegation that a copyright holder acted in bad faith in issuing a
takedown notice without actually conducting a fair use analysis, it is
enough for a misrepresentation claim under § 512(f). 68
Lenz establishes the proposition that copyright holders actually
have to look through every video that is flagged with copyrighted
content before sending a takedown notification,' 69 which is practically
impossible.' It is also an example of a successful use of the counternotification system by an online user.' 7' Although Lenz successfully
used the counter-notification process and actually pursued a suit against
Universal Music Corp.,' 7 2 this is not typically the case because most
users do not know about the system, do not know about their rights
under copyright law, or are too scared to pursue a lawsuit against a mass
media corporation.' 73 This is especially true in the current climate when

164. See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2dat 1155-56.
165. Id. at 1154.
166. 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, the 9th
Circuit held that the "good faith belief' requirement in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2012) requires
a subjective, rather than an objective standard, and that there must be subjective bad faith for a
misrepresentation claim to survive. 391 F.3d at 1004. The Court further found that for a copyright
holder to be liable for knowing misrepresentation it must have had actual knowledge of the
misrepresentation. Id. at 1004-05. Therefore, Rossi established a subjective actual knowledge
standard for misrepresentation and fair use. Id. at 1005; see also Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
167. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1154; see also Rock, supra note 45, at 704-06 (discussing the decision made in this
case and the possible implications that it could have).
170. See infra text accompanying note 207.
171. See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152, 1157.
172. Id. at 1152-53.
173. See Garon, supra note 66, at 524-26.
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increasing numbers of ISPs are using automated infringement filters to
74
flag uploads.1
III.

CONTENT ID DEPRIVES YOUTUBE USERS

OF THEIR RIGHTS

Content ID is a great system for YouTube and for copyright
holders, but it is not so great for YouTube users because it not only fails
to protect them, but also effectively deprives them of their rights under
copyright law. 175 The system is incapable of recognizing fair use, which
means that a lot of videos are flagged as infringing even when they are
not. 176 Furthermore, when these videos are flagged, most users fail to
dispute the claims made against them. 7 7 In addition to the fair use
problems that arise when using a system like Content ID, the
monetization of videos also deprives users of their rights because that
monetization is not
proportional to the amount of copyrighted content
178
used in the video.
A.

The Evolution of YouTube's Content ID System

Despite the fact that the DMCA does not require ISPs to actively
monitor their own websites for infringing content, 179 many websites are
implementing automated filtering systems to find infringing content
before the copyright holders do, and to notify those copyright holders of
the content's existence on the website. 180 YouTube was one of the first
websites to implement an automated filtering system, as well as to try to
improve it.' 8 ' Content ID was introduced in 2007,182 around the same
time as the Viacom case was initiated,'8 3 and YouTube has been using
84
the system ever since.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

179.

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).

180.

See Sonia K. Katyal & Jason M. Schultz, The Unending Search for the Optimal

IhI.A.
III.B-C.
III.B.
I.B.
HI.C.

Infringement Filter, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 83, 93 (2012) (arguing the advantages of using
an automated filtering system and the difficulties of finding the perfect one).
181. Rachel
ZDNET (Oct. 3,

King, You Tube Improving Content ID with New Appeals Process,
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/youtube-improving-content-id-with-new-appeals-

process-7000005199.
182. Christiane Cargill Kinney & Laurin H. Mills, User-Generated Content on the Web:
Implications of Viacom v. YouTube, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=d32b505c-2f23-448f-aOa4-20f3fe32e2c4.
183. Id.
184. See id.
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Content ID functions as YouTube's automated infringement filter,
which was developed entirely by YouTube.' 85 Content ID uses the
digital fingerprints' 86 of copyrighted works and compares them to every
video that is uploaded on the website. 18 7 The system flags a video if it
contains either a full or partial match to any copyrighted material
contained in certain algorithms.' 8 8 Once a video has been flagged as
containing copyrighted content, the system sends a notification to the
copyright holder.' 89 If the copyright holder wants to take action with
regard to the video, she can: (1) mute the audio of the video; (2) block
the whole video from being viewed on the website; (3) monetize the
video by running ads; or (4) track the video's viewership statistics.' 90
Monetizing the video is an increasingly popular option because it allows
the copyright holder to benefit without compromising users' ability to
upload videos that contain copyrighted work.1 9' Monetization also poses
a problem, however, when the majority of the content uploaded is
original content or the uploader's livelihood depends on her YouTube
videos. 92 In addition to the copyright holder being notified of a flag, the
original uploader of the video also gets a notification that the video was
flagged and if the copyright holder takes action, the uploader can dispute
the claim. 93 Unfortunately, most users do not dispute Content ID claims
because they are either unaware of their rights under copyright law, are
afraid to actually be sued for infringement by a mass media copyright
holder, or both. 94
After Content ID was launched in 2007, it soon became clear that
the system was not perfect, but it took a few years for any improvements
to be made.' 9' In 2012, YouTube launched improvements to the Content
185. See How Content ID Works, supra note 12.
186. The digital fingerprinting process employed by Content ID is also known as
steganography. Steganography, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
"steganography," also termed "digitalfingerprinting"or "digitalwatermarking" as "a cryptographic
method that digitally embeds or encodes one item of information in another" and stating that
"[c]opyright or trademark tags can be hidden in every fragment of a digital work, making
disassociation almost impossible").
187. How Content ID Works, supra note 12.
188. David Kravets, YouTube Changes Copyright Algorithms, Manually Reviewing
Infringement Claims, WIRED.CO.UK. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/201210/04/google-copyright-algorithms.
189. How Content ID Works, supranote 12.
190. Id.
191. See infra Part I.C.
192. See infra Part II.C.
193. Dispute a Content ID Claim, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797454?hl=en&ref topic=2778545 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
194. See Garon, supranote 66, at, 524-26.
195. See Alfishawi, supra note 11.
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ID system in the form of a new appeals process, smarter detection of
unintentional claims, and improved matching quality.' 96 The new
appeals process provided users with two options when their dispute to a
Content ID claim was rejected: release the claim or file a formal DMCA
notification.197 Though this was a change from the original appeals
process, where users were left with no recourse if a dispute was
rejected,'98 it is not exactly a big improvement. The two choices users
really have are either to accept the claim, even if the content is not
infringing, or file a lawsuit, which most users will not do for fear of
taking on a mass media corporation. 99 The smarter detection of
unintentional claims involves new algorithms to detect potentially
invalid claims that are then put in a queue to be manually reviewed by
the content owner.2° This is certainly a step in the right direction, but it
still runs up against the problem of the inefficiency of manually
reviewing countless videos in the world of automated filters.2 ' The final
improvement made to the system involved improving the matching
quality of the algorithms on the system.2" 2 While those updates have
helped, there are still issues that arise from using an automated filter like
Content ID.

203

B. ContentID Is Incapable of Recognizing Fair Use
The inability to recognize fair use is an issue inherent in automated
filters like the Content ID system. 20 4 The entirely automated system flags
every video that is even a partial match to copyrighted content,
regardless of whether the video would be considered fair use.2 5 Several
students and scholars have proposed solutions to this issue, 2 °6 but all of
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See infra Part 11I.B.
200. Alfishawi, supra note 11.
201. See Rock, supra note 45, at 715-18 (arguing that fair use should not be considered in a
DMCA analysis because it would be inefficient).
202. Alfishawi, supra note 11.
203. See infra Part III.B-C.
204. See Mike Masnick, How Google's ContentID System Fails at Fair Use & The Public
Domain, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8, 2012, 2:55 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/artices/20120808/
12301619967/how-googles-contentid-system-fails-fair-use-public-domain.shtml.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 81, at 955-59 (proposing more comprehensive user
generated rights, and more balance in the Copyright Law in general, so that users are more protected
in an increasingly online and automated world); Ashley, supra note 4, at 602-06 (proposing
amendments to the DMCA itself so that users are more equally protected online); Leister, supra
note 81, at 128-37 (noting the uselessness of the fair use doctrine in an increasingly digital world,
especially following the Lenz case, which established that a fair use analysis had to be done before
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them require human review of all flagged videos, which is an entirely
unrealistic requirement to impose upon ISPs given how many reports of
infringement are made through automated filters.20 7 Requiring ISPs to
manually review every video flagged for infringement would very
quickly put them out of business because the sheer number of people and
hours required for the endeavor would be more than they could
handle. 20 8 Furthermore, Lenz set a standard that requires copyright
holders to do a fair use analysis before sending a takedown notification
(or acting on a Content ID flag), which also imposes the unrealistic
29
expectation of human review on ISPs and copyright holders. 1
The inability of the system to recognize fair use gives rise to
another problem on the user side. 21 The vast majority of people do not
use the counter-notification system set up by YouTube, even if the
flagged videos would qualify as fair use.21' Most people have no idea
what the fair use doctrine is or that, under this doctrine, they have any
right to use copyrighted works.21 2 This issue is only exacerbated by the
fact that the information provided about fair use on YouTube is minimal
at best, and thus, even if users were to go look at that webpage, they
would still be largely uninformed." 3 Furthermore, even if a user is aware
of the fair use doctrine, and what it allows, most users are reluctant to
use the counter-notification system that YouTube provides for claim
disputes out of fear of a lawsuit by a large mass media corporation.2 14
Between the lack of education about the fair use doctrine, and the fear of
being sued for copyright infringement, the counter-notification system
within Content ID is rarely used.215 This only makes the fair use
situation worse because when Content ID flags those videos for
infringement, there is no one there ready to dispute that claim or fight for
her rights under the fair use doctrine. 216 Therefore, this Note proposes a
issuing a takedown notice); McKay, supra note 10, at 139-45 (proposing stricter penalties for
invalid flags and takedown notifications on videos, and more protections for transformative works
uploaded by users online).
207. Statistics, supra note 136 (indicating that hundreds of millions of videos have been
claimed using Content ID since its inception); see also Rock, supra note 45, at 715-18 (illustrating
the inefficiency of the fair use doctrine when determining copyright liability for online content).
208. See id.
209. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
210. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
211. See Garon, supra note 66, at 523-27; Leister, supra note 81, at 116-20.
212. See Garon, supra note 66, at 523-27; Halbert, supra note 81, at 936.
213. See What is Fair Use?, supra note 133.
214. hankschannel, How to Deal with Copyright Claims (and More), YOuTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZM9Z9us-url (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (explaining how
Content ID works and showing step by step how a claim and dispute can be made).
215. Id.
216. See Garon, supra note 66, at 523-27.
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259

solution to the fair use problem through education of users, as opposed
to through further regulation of the ISPs.217
C. The Monetization of Videos Flaggedby Content ID
Is Not Proportional
Another issue that arises out of the Content ID system is related to
the way in which videos are monetized once they have been flagged and
claimed as infringing.218 When a video gets monetized on YouTube, an
ad is run in front of the video before it starts. The profits from
monetization are split between the copyright holder and YouTube itself,
leaving nothing for the content creator, even if the majority of the video
is not infringing. 9 Furthermore, a copyright holder can monetize the
video regardless of whether the content creator already had an ad
running in front of it or not. 22 1 In addition, when a copyright holder
choses to do this, the whole video gets monetized without respect to how
much copyrighted content is actually in the video. 22 1 Therefore, the user
who uploaded the video gets absolutely nothing and is deprived of her
rights to her own original material that is in the video. 22 Even if the user
did not have ads on the video and does not want to financially benefit
from the video, monetization is in favor of the copyright owner, takes
opportunity away from the content creator, and results in copyright
holders benefiting from more than just their copyrighted work. 23
A prime example of the dangers of the Content ID system, and the
monetization option it offers, is the recent flood of flags on YouTube
videos, especially those videos that provide commentary on video
games, which are entitled to fair use protection.2 24 In 2013, there was a
217. See infra Part V.A.
218. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
219. See vlogbrothers, The Bizarre State of Copyright, YouTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-hGFCQiKUws (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (explaining the general state of copyright
with respect to YouTube).
220. See id.
221. See hankschannel, supranote 214.
222. See id; vlogbrothers, supra note 219.
223. See hankschannel, supranote 214.
224. See, e.g., Colin Campbell, Everything You Need to Know About the Youtube Copyright
Crisis and Why You Should Care, POLYGON (Dec. 14, 2013, 2:57 PM), http://www.polygon.com/
(explaining
2013/12/14/5208782/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-youtube-copyight-crisis
that gameplay videos with commentary are eligible for fair use protection); Kieran Mackintosh,
YouTube Content ID Crackdown, YouTube Confirms New Copyright Claims, CHEAT CODE CENT.
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://dispatches.cheatcc.com/607 (discussing how YouTube decided to cover itself
against infringement by gameplay creators and removed their videos down even when the party
making the claim was not the copyright holder); Paul Tassi, YouTube Unleashes Strange Storm of
Copyright Claims on Video Game Content Producers, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:15 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/12/1 1/youtube-unleashes-strange-storm-of-copyright-
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sudden crackdown on gameplay videos by YouTube, which were not
previously enforced against, because the video game companies who
held the copyrights allowed the commentary and criticism videos
knowing that they acted as a form of advertisement for their games.225
YouTube began this crackdown to try and shield itself from liability; 226
however, most of the flags were not coming from the video game
companies at all, but rather from completely unrelated third parties. 227
The new Content ID algorithm implemented during this crackdown 22 1
flagged anything with matching content and issued notices
accordingly. 22 9 When the videos were flagged, whoever did the flagging
and sent the notice was able to do whatever they wanted with the
video-take it down, monetize it, or otherwise-regardless of whether
they were the actual copyright holders. 23° These third parties should not
be able to flag copyrighted materials when the copyright holders have
allowed them to remain online for so long, especially when the copyright
3
holders allow the content for their own benefit. '
With third parties cracking down on these gameplay videos, a huge
number of content creators on YouTube lost their main source of
income, since they make a living on monetizing videos with
commentary and criticism of video games. 232 This is even more of a
problem considering the fact that when a claim is filed, Content ID
immediately diverts all ad revenue from the video to whoever filed the
claim. 233 Therefore, the ad revenue from the videos monetized by the
claims-on-video-game-content-producers [hereinafter Tassi, YouTube] (referring to the flood of
flags on gameplay video creators); Paul Tassi, The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID Crackdown
Reveals Google's Dark Side, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insertcoin/2013/12/19/the-injustice-of-the-youtube-content-id-crackdown-reveals-googles-dark-side

[hereinafter Tassi, The Injustice] (identifying the adverse impact that the recent crackdown on
gameplay videos had on the creators of those videos).
225. See Tassi, YouTube, supranote 224.
226. See id.
227. See id
228. See supra text accompanying notes 195-203 (discussing the changes made to Content ID
since its inception).
229. See Tassi, YouTube, supra note 224 (maintaining that the likely cause of the sudden
crackdown was a new algorithm implemented by YouTube).
230. See How Content ID Works, supra note 12 (mentioning the options of the Content ID
system and how they can be used).
231. See Mackintosh, supra note 224 (pointing out that the sudden crackdown jeopardized the
livelihoods of many content creators who had made a career on YouTube); Tassi, YouTube, supra
note 224 (stating that video game copyright holders had allowed the gaming videos to remain on
YouTube because they were good publicity).
232. Tassi, YouTube, supranote 224 (emphasizing that many content creators on YouTube rely
on monetized videos as their income).
233. hankschannel, supra note 214 (explaining what happens to ad revenue when a monetized
video is flagged); Tassi, The Injustice, supra note 224.
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content creators of gameplay videos was diverted not to the copyright
holder, who had allowed these videos to remain online, but to the
completely unrelated third party who filed the claim, which YouTube
failed to prevent.234 These content creators are being deprived of their
livelihood and of their rights to the gameplay videos-most of which
contain criticism or commentary, which are both covered by fair usebecause of the automated nature of Content ID and the disproportionate
nature of the monetization used by the system. 35
The example of what happened to the creators of gameplay videos
illustrates how the automated Content ID system can be taken advantage
23 6 This
of, both in terms of flagging, and in terms of monetization.
problem extends beyond these gameplay creators, however, to all
content creators on YouTube who are at the mercy of Content ID and
copyright holders.237 Changes to the system must be effected so that
monetization becomes in some way proportional, content creators
benefit from the rights that they are entitled to, and copyright holders are
unable to take advantage of videos made by content creators just because
they use some part of copyrighted material in their video.238
IV.

PROTECTING THE UNPROTECTED: REASSERTING CONTENT
CREATORS' RIGHTS THROUGH NEW REGULATION

Online content creators are largely unprotected by the current
copyright law, in large part because a lot of it was drafted and enacted
with mass media copyright holders in mind as the leaders in the
entertainment creation industry. 239 Therefore, the current copyright law
needs to be amended in some way to enable the ISP users to freely create
240
the content that is becoming increasingly prevalent as entertainment.
Changes need to be made with respect to how ISPs are required to
handle content that uses copyrighted work in compliance with the fair
241
use exception, largely through education of users as to their rights.

234. Tassi, The Injustice, supra note 224.
235. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Tassi, The Injustice, supranote 224.
236. See Mackintosh, supra note 224; Tassi, The Injustice, supra note 224; Tassi, YouTube,
supra note 224.
237. See hankschannel, supra note 214; vlogbrothers, supranote 219.
238. See infra Part IV.
239. JENKINS, supra note 10, at 189; see also McKay, supra note 10, at 124-27 (considering
the DMCA takedown procedure and the dominant position that mass media has in easily stopping
online expression without any consequences).
240. See Robins, supra note 1, at 4.
241. See infra Part W.A.
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Changes also have to be made to the monetization of online user content
by copyright holders so that it is proportional to the amount of
copyrighted work used in the content.242
A.

Educating the Creator:A New Requirementfor Internet Service
Providersto Supply Information to Creators
About FairUse Protections

The current YouTube Content ID system is completely incapable of
recognizing fair use in videos uploaded by content creators. 243 As such,
content that is not infringing is flagged and then taken down or
monetized in favor of the mass media copyright holder more often than
not, which, in turn, deprives the content creator of her rights.2" The
problem of automated systems' inability to recognize fair use is not a
new one, and several scholars and students have proposed various
solutions to it.245 Most of these solutions propose amendments to the
DMCA to better protect users by requiring the ISPs to better monitor fair
use on their websites and penalizing them for false flags when
monitoring fails.246
These proposals are unrealistic because requiring an ISP to monitor
fair use requires it to use more manpower than it can afford, since
automated systems cannot recognize the exception . 47 Furthermore, these
requirements to monitor fair use on the website would directly oppose
the section of the DMCA that explicitly states that ISPs do not have to
monitor their sites for infringement. 24" Therefore, this Note proposes
amending the DMCA by adding the following provision, which would
require the ISPs to educate content creators on their rights under the fair
use doctrine:
(o) Fair Use.-A service provider will be required to have a page on its
website describing the fair use doctrine in layman's terms. All users
shall be redirected to this page both when they upload a video, and
242. See infra Part IV.B.
243. See Bartholomew, supra note 12, at 77; Masnick, supra note 204; supraPart I.B.
244. See Jonathan Bailey, Why Fair Use Suffers on YouTube, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Sept. 4,
2007), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2007/09/04/why-fair-use-suffers-on-youtube; supra Part
III.B.
245. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
246. See Halbert, supra note 81, at 955-59 (proposing more comprehensive user generated
rights); Ashley, supra note 4, at 602-06 (proposing amendments to the DMCA to protect users);
Leister, supra note 81, at 128-37 (noting the uselessness of the fair use doctrine in an increasingly
digital world); McKay, supra note 10, at 139-44 (proposing stricter penalties for ISPs for invalid
flags and invalid takedowns).
247. See Rock, supra note 45, 715-18; supra Part HI.B.
248.

17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2012).
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when they receive a notification about a video they previously
uploaded being flagged for infiringement.
The purpose of this amendment will be to further educate content
creators so that they may be more inclined to utilize the counternotification procedures available to them under the DMCA and
YouTube's Content ID system.249 Of course, there is no guarantee that
content creators will read the pages they are redirected to, but if people
are more educated about fair use and their rights under the doctrine, they
are less likely to be afraid to fight for those rights against the mass media
copyright holders that could be making false claims without checking for
fair use. 25" Additionally, if people are more educated and more inclined
to fight against false claims based on fair use, perhaps copyright holders
will be more careful when making claims based on the flags of
automated infringement filters.2 5' If, however, educating content creators
about fair use does not motivate them to dispute false claims, or content
creators are not inclined to read the fair use pages to which they are
directed, then an amendment that addresses disproportional monetization
will still act as a partial solution. 5
B. Compensatingthe Creator:A New Requirementfor
Internet Service Providersto Proportionally
Monetize Any Automatically Flagged Videos
A further problem with YouTube's Content ID system is that when
a copyright holder files a complaint and chooses to monetize a video
uploaded by a content creator, then the entire video is monetized for the
copyright holder, regardless of how much copyrighted content is used. 3
Once a video is monetized, all the ad revenue from that video is split
between YouTube and the copyright holder, leaving nothing for the
content creator, even if the majority of the video is the creator's original
work. 254 Additionally, if the content creator does not want to make any
money from the video and has not monetized it herself, once a copyright
holder has monetized the video, it begins to make money on more than
See Garon, supra note 66, at 523-27; Bartholomew, supra note 12, at 73-74.
See Bailey, supranote 244; supra Part III.B.
See hankschannel, supra note 214.
See infra Part IV.B.
See Tassi, The Injustice,supra note 224.
See hankschannel, supra note 214; see also Danielle Duarte, Video Monetization,
YouTube, and Multi-Channel Networks 101, DLREPORTER (Apr. 3, 2014), http://dlreporter.com/
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

(examining a new
2014/04/03/video-monetization-youtube-and-multi-channel-partnerships-101
option that content creators are using to avoid the problem of revenue from monetized videos being
diverted to those who file complaints against their videos).
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just the copyrighted material because the whole video is monetized,
including the parts with the creator's original work.2 55
Therefore, this Note proposes amending the DMCA by adding the
following provision, which will ensure that any monetization of videos
will be proportional to the amount of copyrighted material used in it:
(p) Monetization.-When a video is monetized a service provider will
be required to ensure that this monetization will be done in a manner
proportional to the amount of copyrighted material used by the content
creator in the video. A copyright holder who chooses to monetize a
flagged video shall not be able to make money on the portions of that
video that do not contain his copyright materials.
The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that copyright holders
are not benefitting from more than just the works for which they hold the
copyrights, and that the content creators are not taken advantage of when
the copyright holders decide to monetize videos that have been flagged
as infringing. 256 Furthermore, this amendment is something of a backup
for the amendment proposed above because content creators will still be
protected in some way if the education about fair use is not effective in
increasing the use of counter-notifications. 7 Although it is impossible
to monitor all the fair uses on an ISP's website, and there is no guarantee
that the content creators will read the webpages detailing the fair
use doctrine, the ISPs can at least be required to make sure that videos
are not monetized disproportionally to the amount of copyrighted
content in them.258
Automated systems like Content ID already flag videos based on
the existence of a certain (usually small) amount of copyrighted material
and provide options to copyright holders to track a video's viewership
statistics. 9 Since the algorithms are based, at least in part, on the
duration of the copyrighted work's usage in the video, and certain things
about the video can already be tracked, it does not seem like much of a
stretch to require these systems to monitor exactly what proportion of
the video contains a copyrighted work.26 ° Then, when copyright holders
monetize a video flagged as infringing, these new statistics about the

255. See hankschannel, supra note 214; supra Part IHI.C.
256. See Bartholomew, supra note 12, at 68; Mackintosh, supra note 224; Tassi, The Injustice,
supra note 224.
257. See supraParts HIC, IV.A.
258. See Bailey, supra note 244; Statistics, supra note 136; supra Parts H.C, 1V.A.
259. How Content ID Works, supra note 12.

260. See id.
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amount of copyrighted work in the video can be used to set the revenue
received by the copyright holder without allowing it to benefit from the
content creator's original works in the video.26 1
C. Arguments Against These ProposedSolutions and
Responses to Them
Several scholars and students have already proposed different
solutions to the continuing issues posed by the application of current
copyright law to the content that users upload to YouTube. 26 2 The
biggest criticism to any proposed solution to the fair use problem is that
the fair use doctrine has become antiquated in the age of the Internet and
the DMCA. 263 A criticism of the idea of proportional monetization is
that those proportions will not take into account the heart of the matter,
or main purpose, of the content in the video in question.2 4
The fair use doctrine is too seminal within copyright law to
eliminate it completely as some authors have proposed. 265 The fair use
doctrine preserves the essential constitutional purpose of copyright law
because it allows content creators to use copyrighted work to advance
art, education, research, and science. 266 Without the fair use doctrine, no
one would be able to use copyrighted works for anything at all when
they are relevant to the cultural consciousness because copyright
protections last so long.267 By the time that the works are no longer
protected by copyright, most of them will not be relevant to advancing
the goals of copyright law, given that copyright protection lasts for
seventy years beyond the death of the author.268 Since the fair use
doctrine is so important, the solution proposed in this Note is the most
effective alternative to resolve the problem posed by Content ID's
inability to recognize fair use in videos.269 This is especially true given
the fact that it is physically and economically impossible for YouTube to

261. See Statistics, supranote 136; supra Part HI.C.
262. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
263. Rock, supranote 45, at 719.
264. See Fair Use and Permission, N.C. ST. U., http://www.provost.ncsu.edu/copyright/
resources/tutorials/FairUseandPermission.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (discussing the
considerations necessary for the proportionality factor of the fair use doctrine, which can be related
to proportional monetization).
265. See Rock, supranote 45, at 711-19.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Lee, supra note 135, at 1513, 1522 (emphasizing the
importance of user-generated content to the constitutional purpose of copyright law).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (pointing out that copyright protections last for seventy years
beyond the death of the author).
268. See id.
269. See supra Parts 1I.B, VA.
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have each video manually reviewed for fair use. 270 As a result, if fair use
is to continue to be a major exception to copyright law, content creators
must be educated about the doctrine so that they can fight for their rights
when videos are erroneously flagged. 7'
It could be argued that proportional monetization could prove to be
problematic, because it may only take into account the actual timing of
the copyrighted material and not the impact that material has on
viewership of the video.27 2 Arguably, if the copyrighted work in the
video gets to the heart of the matter of the copyrighted work, or is the
main reason why anyone watches the video, then the content creator's
proportion of the revenue should be less than that of the copyright
holder. 273 The concept of "the heart of the matter" of a copyrighted work
appears in the fair use doctrine primarily, 274 but it is just as applicable to
the proportional monetization of videos. 275 This argument against
proportional monetization is defeated, however, by the way that a
YouTube video is ranked. 276 There are several factors that determine the
ranking of a YouTube video: relevant keywords; video tags; 277 title; 278
descriptions;2 79 thumbnails; 2 0 video transcripts; 28 1 channel authority; 282
views and video retention;283 comments; subscribers; 284 shares; 285
270. See Statistics, supra note 136 (specifying that hundreds of millions of videos have been
claimed using Content ID by the over 8000 partners who take advantage of the system); see also
Rock, supra note 45, at 716-17 (expressing that the capability of automated filters far surpasses the
ability of people to review the same material).
271. See supra Part [V.A.
272. See Arsham, supra note 11, at 790-91 (illutrating that the monetization model used by
YouTube could lead to over-regulation and under-regulation).
273. See generallyFairUse and Permission,supra note 264.
274. Id.
275. See id.; supra note 273 and accompanying text.
276. See Navneet Kaushal, How to Make Your Videos Rank Better on You Tube, CLICKZ (June
23, 2014), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2351591/how-to-make-your-videos-rank-betteron-youtube.
277. Id. Tags are descriptive keywords that can help viewers find a video. Formatting Tags,
YoUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/146402?hl=en (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
278. Kaushal, supranote 276.
279. Id.
280. Id. A thumbnail is an image that shows viewers a quick snapshot of the video before they
view it in full. Video Thumbnails, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
7243 l?hl=en (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
281. Kaushal, supra note 276. Transcripts contain only the text of what is said in the video.
Transcripts, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2734799?hl=en
(last visited
Nov. 22, 2015).
282. Kaushal, supra note 276.
283. Id. An audience retention report shows, among other things, the average view time for all
videos and also shows the viewership for specific parts of each video. Audience Retention Report,
YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1715160?hl=en (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
284. Kaushal, supra note 276.
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favorites; 286 thumbs up or down; 2 87 and backlinks. 21

Some of these
features can be used to track how much of a copyrighted work is used in
a video and how it impacts the video's viewership (whether the
289
copyrighted material is the heart of the matter of the video).
Specifically, video transcripts and video retention can be used to track
the impact of the copyrighted work on a video.2 90 Since video transcripts
only show the spoken material in the video, it should be simple to pick
out the text of any copyrighted material that was used, especially if it
contains movie or television clips.2 91 Video retention statistics can be
especially helpful, as well, since viewership statistics are available for
each and every part of a video.2 92 This directly addresses the potential
problem with proportional monetization because content creators,
YouTube, or copyright holders can check the statistics for the part of the
video that includes the copyrighted work.293 If that part of the video has
higher viewership statistics than the rest of the video, then it is probably
safe to assume that the copyrighted material is the primary reason people
watch the video and the proportional split of the revenue can be adjusted
295
accordingly.294 Therefore, the solution proposed by this Note
can directly address the problem posed by a copyrighted work
being the heart of the matter of the video instead of the content created
by the user.296
V.

CONCLUSION

Huge changes in technology and the increased use of the Internet as
a source of entertainment have allowed more and more people to create
original content and to use copyrighted material to create something
new. 297 The current copyright law does not reflect these changes despite
the implementation of the DMCA.29 8 The DMCA heavily favors mass
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.; see also What Are Backlinks and How Do I Use Them?, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/blogger/answer/42533?hl=en ("Backlinks display other webpages that
link to your posts.") (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
289. See Audience Retention Report, supranote 283.
290. See id.; Transcripts,supra note 281.
291. See Transcripts,supra note 281.
292. Audience Retention Reports, supra note 283.
293. See generally id.
294. See generally id; Fair Use and Permission,supra 264.
295. See supra Part IV.A-B.
296. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part l.B.
298. See supra Part H.B.
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media copyright holders because it was enacted before the explosion of
user-created content on the Internet.2 99 Furthermore, the application of
the DMCA to ISPs like YouTube heavily favors the websites over the
content creators who made them big.3"' This puts online content creators
at a severe disadvantage given their lack of resources and knowledge of
the law.30 1
This Note has proposed amendments to the DMCA that seek to
educate the content creators about their rights, ensure that they are
protected, and allow them to benefit from original works if they choose
to do so.30 2 The proposed modifications seek to educate content creators
about fair use with the goal of encouraging them to utilize the counternotification and dispute features available to them through Content
ID. 3"3 The proposed legislation further seeks to guarantee that any of the
original works of content creators are not taken advantage of and that
monetization only leads to revenue for the copyright holder based on the
actual copyrighted work in the video.30 4 These new amendments to the
DMCA will allow online content creators to be better informed about
their rights and more confident about their ability to benefit from the
original content that they spent so much time working on.30 5
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299. See supra Part II.B.
300. See supra Part II.C.
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